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It is generally agreed that sustainable mine action requires finding local solutions to the problems of mines and other explosive rem-nants of war. What is of more debate is the precise form these solu-
tions should take. 
Over the past 15 years, we have seen local commercial companies 
and nongovernmental organizations play only a modest role in most 
major mine-action programs.1 This low level of involvement suggests 
that vital opportunities for enhancing the cost-effectiveness, sustain-
abi l it y a nd broader 
i mp a c t  o f  n at ion a l 
mine-action programs 
may have been over-
looked. Local NGOs, 
for example, are often 
limited to running low-
cost mine-r isk edu-
cation projects rather 
than more expensive 
demining operations.
The last 15 years 
notwithstanding, the 
situation is now evolv-
ing quite rapidly, as 
i l lustrated by recent 
developments in Iraq 
a nd  S u d a n ,  a m on g 
ot hers .  In nor t hern 
Iraq, for example, responsibilities for mine-risk education and demin-
ing are largely entrusted to local organizations. In central and southern 
Iraq, the creation of new local mine-clearance and mine-risk educa-
tion organizations is being supported by the Iraq National Mine Action 
Authority and by international NGOs. In Sudan, some local NGOs con-
duct modest amounts of demining. 
Distinguishing an NgO from a Commercial Company
It is a common misconception that NGOs and other not-for-profit 
organizations must operate to break even financially and that, should 
their income exceed their expenses in a given year, they have improp-
erly earned a “profit.” Surplus is the general term for the excess of an 
organization’s income over its expenses for a period of time. Profit is a 
specific type of surplus—one that is “appropriable,” or owned by legal 
individuals (i.e., real persons or legally established organizations). 
A profit-seeking organization operates with the intention of earning 
surpluses that will flow, ultimately, to the owners. A not-for-profit orga-
nization may earn surpluses, but these cannot be taken by or used to 
benefit, those people closely connected to the organization, such as the 
founders, members of the board, managers or employees. 
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As more local nongovernmental organizations develop, establishing a distinction between local NGOs and 
commercial companies has become a growing concern for potential donors. The differences between NGOs 
and firms can be difficult to determine at times. 
Most not-for-profit organizations that provide significant benefits 
to the general public, such as local demining NGOs, must accumulate 
surpluses over time if they are to be sustainable and operate efficiently. 
These accumulated surpluses are needed to provide working capital (e.g., 
to pay deminers, purchase insurance and rent equipment before the 
NGO receives payment for its demining), to replace vehicles and equip-
ment every few years and to cover the organization’s legal obligations 
in the event that it must wind up its affairs (e.g., severance payments to 
employees ,  rema i n-
ing months of rental 
agreements a nd t he 





ble not to manage their 
a f fa irs so as to earn 
a reasonable surplus 
or f inancia l reser ve 
for operations. 
T h e  d i s t i n c t i o n 
between surplus and 
prof it appears to be 
u n c l e a r  t o  r e g u l a -
tory officials as well as 
donors. This misun-
derstanding can lead to some unnecessary financial subterfuge: As one 
administrator of a Bosnian NGO put it, “We are required to end the 
year at zero, but there are positive zeros and negative zeros.”
Implications for Mine Action
Given the realities in the field, one can fairly ask the question: 
Would it make much difference to anyone if, say, all the local demi-
ning NGOs in Bosnia, Mozambique or even Afghanistan were rein-
corporated as local commercial companies (or vice versa)? Indeed, 
the argument could be made that the main “beneficiaries” of these 
organizations, having a not-for-profit legal status, may be officials in 
donor agencies who typically face much less paperwork when award-
ing grants to NGOs than managing competitive tenders open to com-
mercial companies.
In terms of the difference—real or perceived—between commercial 
companies and NGOs, it appears that there is a significant degree of over-
lap with some companies masquerading as NGOs. Furthermore, some 
NGOs behave much the same as commercial companies, at least within 
the demining field—operating as contractors just as demining firms do. 
Because of this overlap, donors are unlikely to be certain whether a new 
“This low level of involvement sug-
gests that vital opportunities for en-
hancing the cost-effectiveness, 
sustainability and broader impact of 
national mine-action programs may 
have been overlooked.”
1
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Mohammed Karim Latif practices mine detecting in Maidan, Iraq, in 1999. The United Nations is training 
the Kurds of the area to clear minefields. 
AP PHOTO / JOCKEL FINCK
organization that purports to be an NGO is a “true” NGO, 
with altruistic rather than profit-seeking objectives.
As a result of these complications, it is unclear whether 
donors (and perhaps even local officials) are in a position 
to distinguish “true” commercial companies from “true” 
NGOs. If those financing mine action cannot distinguish 
between local commercial companies and local NGOs, 
why should such a distinction be important in the mine-
action field?
Why the Distinction?
There appear to be two principal reasons why donors 
draw a distinction between local commercial companies 
and NGOs. First, the policies of donor and U.N. agen-
cies often make it far easier to award grants than to orga-
nize competitive bids. In most cases, donor policies do not 
allow grants to a profit-seeking firm, so these donors often 
prefer dealing with local NGOs rather than with local 
commercial companies.
Second, some donors actively promote the growth of 
“civil society,” particularly as part of a peace-building 
effort or to foster pluralism in former socialist countries. 
In such cases, money may be far easier to come by for local 
NGOs than for firms.
Administrative convenience is a very poor reason for 
favoring NGOs over commercial companies, especially 
when one cannot distinguish between “true” commercial 
companies and “true” NGOs. Indeed, the probable impact 
of such a practice is damaging to the reputation of “true” 
NGOs. But the argument that favoring NGOs is warranted 
in terms of fostering civil society also is unpersuasive.
 
A Better Approach: A Task Focus
A far better approach would be for donors, U.N. agen-
cies and the mine-action center to focus not on the often-
blurred distinction between local commercial companies 
and NGOs, but on the nature of the demining tasks. 
Where a task is a clear priority and well-defined, the per-
formance of the demining operator can easily be moni-
tored and there is less chance the operator will use unsafe 
procedures or demonstrate substandard work. Such a task 
should be awarded by a competitive bidding process open 
to any accredited organization that meets the prequalifi-
cation criteria (e.g., demonstrated financial capacity and 
experience). A fixed-price contract should then be awarded 
to the organization submitting the lowest bid that other-
wise meets the technical criteria.
Conversely, when what constitutes good performance 
is not readily apparent (e.g., the operator in a remote area 
will determine which tasks should be a priority) or when 
the level of effort required to complete the task cannot be 
gauged accurately (e.g., clearance of an urban area with 
extensive rubble), the contract should take the form of a 
“cost plus” agreement (contract or grant)—essentially hir-
ing the organization and its assets to complete a set of tasks 
that cannot be clearly specified in advance. This method 
removes the incentive for the contractor to select easy tasks 
that should not be clearance priorities or to do substandard 
work that would endanger deminers or the general public.
In the cases in which the nature of the task cannot be 
defined precisely, the agreements must allow the demining 
organization greater latitude. In return for this latitude, the contractor should be 
held to a higher standard of accountability. Assessing the performance of organiza-
tions that enjoy significant leeway is a more complex matter and should be based in 
part on post-clearance land-use surveys. These surveys will shed light on whether the 
right tasks were done, the cleared land and structures reached the target beneficiaries 
and the beneficiaries are satisfied with the quality of clearance. 
In other words, monitoring needs to encompass not only the demining out-
puts (e.g., clearance was done according to safety and quality standards) but also 
the nature of the outcomes (i.e., the socioeconomic benefits accruing to the tar-
get beneficiaries).
There is no evidence that NGOs perform better than commercial companies, or 
vice versa; so, rather than focusing on the legal status of the implementing partners, 
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which may tell little about the underlying 
orientation of the organization and its man-
agers, donors and the mine-action center 
should focus on the nature of the demining 
tasks and employ an appropriate contracting 
mechanism for each type of task. 
Moreover, the rapid expansion of local 
NGOs has led to some searching questions. 
In some countries, the explosive growth in 
the numbers of local NGOs seems to ref lect 
donor largesse more than true “felt needs” 
on the part of local populations. Often the 
local NGOs bore little resemblance to indig-
enous forms of sel f-help organizat ions. 
Some so-called NGOs were created by gov-
ernments (or by indiv idua l government 
off icials) as a way to capture some of the 
international funding.
The NgO Advantage: Trust 
There are situations, however, in which 
local NGOs may have a potential advantage. 
Where a country’s government barely func-
tions or has little interest in the well-being 
of citizens in remote communities, how does 
one deliver essential public services—includ-
ing mine action—in mine-affected communi-
ties? Often in such situations, it is extremely 
difficult to monitor the performance of orga-
nizations working with remote communities. 
Often the mine-action center is also weak 
and underfunded. 
When faced with such dilemmas, donors 
traditionally have sought international NGOs 
with established reputations and provided 
them with grants that do not have detailed 
performance targets—essentially, a “cost plus” 
contract for a period of time rather than a set 
of tasks. The international NGO then has the 
flexibility to respond to the needs it discovers 
in the remote communities. Typically, donors 
select international NGOs rather than firms 
in such cases because they trust the NGOs. 
But what is the basis of this trust, and how can 
local NGOs become trustworthy?
The Basis of Trust
There are two key elements underlying 
the trustworthiness of an organization: moti-
vation and governance, which we will discuss 
in order.
The motivations of “true” firms and “true” 
NGOs differ. “True” firms seek profits, while 
“true” NGOs promote public wel l-being. 
Motivation cannot be observed directly, how-
ever, so how do donors determine whether a 
local NGO is a “true” NGO? 
The answer is experience. Large inter-
national NGOs have extensive experience 
that indicates they seek to promote public 
well-being rather than focus on profits. As 
local NGOs gain experience, they too can 
demonstrate their motivations are for public 
well-being. But how does an NGO—whether 
local or international—get the chance to dem-
onstrate its motivation through experience in 
managing projects if the donors do not trust 
them in the first place? Initially, donors may 
risk small grants for, say, mine-risk education 
projects, but rarely the large sums required 
for demining.
The answer to this question is gover-
nance. Successful international NGOs have 
highly respected and trusted individuals on 
their boards, who oversee the management 
to ensure the NGO is run to benefit the pub-
lic.2 With respected board members, an NGO 
has the opportunity to obtain donations and 
demonstrate its motivations, leading to more 
donations, thus, creating a virtuous circle. 
What has been lacking in the development 
of local mine-action NGOs—particularly for 
expensive demining operations—is sound 
governance. Most developing countries—
and certainly failed states where local NGOs 
are most needed to deliver public services—
lack adequate legislation to require NGOs to 
have proper governance systems. Donors and 
established NGOs that wish to support the 
development of local NGOs should encour-
age these organizations to go beyond exist-
ing legal requirements in their countries and 
adopt best practices in NGO governance.3 
Managers of local NGOs that want to attract 
increased support would be wise to institute 
best practices on their own.
Conclusions
There is no evidence that NGOs perform 
better than commercial companies in dem-
ining, or vice versa. So rather than focus-
ing on the legal status of the implementing 
partners, donors and the mine-action center 
should focus on the nature of the demining 
tasks and employ an appropriate contract-
ing mechanism for each type of task. Where 
the priority of a task and the level of effort 
to complete it are clear, contracts should be 
awarded via a competitive bidding process 
(i.e., pay a fixed price for the task and then 
monitor safety and the quality of the out-
put). Where it is unclear which tasks should 
take priority or when it is impossible to esti-
mate the level of effort required for a com-
plex task, contracts should be awarded on a 
cost-plus basis (i.e., hiring a set of assets for a 
fixed period of time and monitoring both the 
outputs produced and the outcomes accruing 
to beneficiaries). 
See Endnotes, page 112
This article is excerpted from the GICHD’s 
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